The present paper explores the correlation between political systems, and fiscal policies, very much in the footsteps of the seminal work by Roubini and Sachs (1989) , thus focusing on the relative dispersion or concentration of political power as the main political characteristic. The principal theoretical goal is to predict those changes in fiscal policy that may be induced by modifications in the partisan structure of political systems, as compared to cross-sectional differences between constitutional systems. Following the distinction between the cash-based, and the accrual based approach to public finance, the paper attempts to study the government's fiscal stance as capital balances, besides treating the current flows. The theoretical model introduced in this paper attempts to define the possible appropriation of liquid assets in the public sector, starting from the basic fiscal equation. Empirical research presented consists of both a quantitative, econometric part, and qualitative case studies. The classification of political systems is based on the distinctions introduced in the Database of Political Systems, as published by the World Bank. Said distinctions regard the possible concentration of power in the hands of a president, and the degree of proportionality in the electoral regime; they form the constitutional frames of the political system. The degree of political polarization regarding economic policy is the main measure of partisan fragmentation. Quantitative research allowed concluding that political systems do differ as for the amount of liquid capital held by the public sector. Three broad clusters of countries were defined, regarding their political systems, and these clusters display a significant disparity as for the observable fiscal stance. Case studies sampled from those clusters lead to conclude that the amount of liquid assets held by the public sector changes in close correlation to political polarization. The main path open for future research is the question whether fiscal variables can indicate pre-emptively the emergence of political veto players, even before their official appearance in the partisan, or the constitutional structure.
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Introduction
Research on fiscal policy encompasses the issue of the so-called structural factors of the government's fiscal stance. The "structural factors" in question refer, to a great extent, to the characteristics of the political system in place. In 1989, Roubini and Sachs introduced the concept of structural debt to GDP ratio, as opposed to the cyclically determined one (Roubini, Sachs 1989 1 ). They made a connection between that structural tendency to indebtedness, on the one hand, and the characteristics of the political system in place -more specifically to the relative strength of the government in wage bargaining. The more dispersed political power, the lesser that strength, and the greater proneness to the accumulation of public debt. In empirical terms, that theoretical construct was used to explain increasing, but unevenly increasing public debt in the developed countries over the 1970s and the 1980s. Macroeconomic optimization of public policies assumes that fiscal policy consists most of all in managing the current macroeconomic forces that impact the fiscal performance.
Basic fiscal aggregates -spending, tax revenues and debt -are supposed to be the cumulative effect of a series of current, short term adaptations, on the part of the government, to the macroeconomic situation at hand. In this view, budgetary deficit happens or increases when the government fails to match its spending to tax revenues.
An implicit assumption here is that the null fiscal balance, with spending equal to tax revenues, is the fiscal equilibrium. Any departing from that heavenly state is a symptom of disequilibrium. Consequently, public borrowing is a compensatory action on the part of the government, to stay financially liquid when in financial distress. In political sciences, this approach to fiscal policy is somehow reflected in the so-called "pork barrel theory" (see for example: Weingast et al. 1981 4 ) , which states that the relative disparity of interests among social groups represented in the political system impacts government expenditure. Just as more different pigs means the necessity of a bigger barrel to feed them, a greater diversity of social interests represented in the political system means more money necessary to satisfy them. That relationship has its source in the phenomenon of political bargaining between various agents inside the government. The "I-do-something-for-your-voters-if-you-do-something-for-my-voters" pattern of policy making is widely known, and the pork barrel theory associates it with fiscal policies. Once more, just as in the macroeconomic optimization of fiscal policies, we come to the implied assumption that there is a hypothetically efficient fiscal policy (probably associated with null budgetary deficit). Both the cyclical economic factors, and the political bargaining may deviate the actual fiscal policy from that state of equilibrium.
Both the macroeconomic optimization of fiscal policies, and the pork barrel theory in political sciences refer to the concept of efficiency in public policies. Going even more in depth of their assumptions, one can see that efficiency of public policies is evaluated on the grounds of macroeconomic outcomes. In other words, in this perspective, governments are par excellence subservient to their nations. That, of course, reflects some aspects of public policies, yet not all of those aspects. There is a theoretical stream in macroeconomics, designated sometimes as the theory of endogenous growth, which points at an interesting paradox: governments are systematically counter-rational in their fiscal policies. They conflate their deficits in the times of prosperity, whilst they should benefit of said prosperity to buckle up their accounts a little. Conversely, our rulers consistently try to reduce their deficits in times of cyclical crises, when the last rational thing to do is to cut on government spending (see for example: (np. Barro and oppose them to cyclical factors like inflation, exchange rates or unemployment. In other words, are politics really more "structural" than, for example, the patterns observable in the labour market or in the stock exchange? After all, and especially in the case of developed countries, the long terms trends of inflation or unemployment are frequently more predictable than public policies and political institutions.
Three intuitive distinctions seem to underlie the general, theoretical dichotomy between the cyclical and the structural factors of fiscal policies. Firstly, macroeconomic changes impact the actual tax revenues. The same tax base yields different tax revenue, and creates various pressures for public borrowing, according to the rate of inflation, economic growth and unemployment. Secondly, it is possible to demonstrate econometrically that in the overall variance of the actual fiscal balance there is a part clearly attributable to the variance of macroeconomic factors. The remaining residual is called "structural balance". Thirdly, there is the "exogenous <> endogenous" dichotomy.
We tend to consider political factors as structural just because we see them as inherent to the given, national social system. On the other hand, factors that we use to call cyclical (inflation, unemployment etc.) are perceived as at least partly exogenous and imposed by global economic trends.
That last distinction (i.e. endogenous <> exogenous) seems to be the soundest approach, yet there is a theoretical doubt to elucidate. If political factors were considered to be strictly endogenous, there would be no point in any cross-sectional comparison, or in any congruent measurement of political characteristics (see for example : Almond 1956 16 ). There is need for some kind of common denominator(s) in political systems.
That common denominator is to be found both in the classics, and in the most recent developments. As for the classics, there is an old claim, postulated by Francois Quesnay, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Jean Baptiste Say: public spending is rather a form of circulating capital than a financial flow strictly spoken. The assumption that governments manage capital balances rather than flows seem to be constantly present in the discourse about public policy. The French historical school (see for example:
Braudel 1981 17 ), as well as to its newest developments in economics (e.g. Piketty 2013 18 ) claim very much the same. Strangely enough, that assumption can be used for quite disparate argumentations, as, for example, those about the burden created by 16 implicitly assume that public borrowing creates some sort of additional liquidity in the capital balances of the economy. As far as public debt is concerned, it is interesting to point out that borrowing is essentially a legal tool for facilitating the transfer of capital.
Once more, we return to the classics, and to Adam Smith's intuition that massive public borrowing takes place when there is a wealthy class of private owners with substantial financial surpluses to invest. In other words, governments borrow mostly because they can, not because they have to. Over 80% of the global, gross public debt is owed by 6 highly developed economies: United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, and Italy. One possible interpretation of this stylized fact is that the biggest economies absorb the major part of global macroeconomic shocks, and thus accumulated the greatest mass of public debt. Still, another explanation is possible. In the times of economic shocks, investors are risk averse; they turn massively away from risky investment in productive assets and shift their investment towards much less risky sovereign debt. Hence, massive accumulation of public debt occurs not only as a symptom of financial distress on the part of the governments, but also as a shift in investment strategies played in financial markets.
Thus, we face those two possible approaches to fiscal policy. It can be viewed as the management of current flows, with the null fiscal balance being the state of equilibrium.
Conversely (or complementarily), fiscal policy may be considered as public management of capital balances. Here we come back to the connection between political systems, and fiscal policies. Roubini aptitude to deal with macroeconomic shocks: countries with more dispersed political power tend to be feebler in their response to such shocks than countries with noticeably more concentrated political power. Conversely, the present paper argues that political systems differ in their fiscal stances mostly because there is a close match between political systems, and the amount of capital those systems need to work. In that respect, the research follows the theoretical path set by Barry Weingast and his claim that political systems work to a large extent as a game of claims on capital, played between public and private agents (see for example: Weingast 1981 30 , 1995 31 ). The present paper claims that each individual political system rests on a specific amount of legitimation conferred to public rulers through a long-term, discursive process, as well as on a specific appropriation of capital by the public sector. Jurgen Habermas's theory of politics (Habermas 1975 (Habermas 32 , 1979 (Habermas 33 , 1996 34 ), and Nancy Fraser's concept of "strong publics" (Fraser 1990 35 ) are an additional theoretical reference in that respect.
Appropriation of capital is understood as such a natural possession of capital, which through its duration and autonomy from external claims allows the appropriation of capital rent.
Two interesting intellectual streams have been emerging recently, and they seem quite promising for the purposes of the present research: the theory of veto players, and the initiative known as the Database of Political Institutions. The theory of veto players, as introduced by George Tsebelis (see for example: Tsebelis 2002 36 ), characterises the current state of any political system through its relative capacity for policy change, or, conversely, its tendency to preserve the status quo. Any status quo has its counterpart in the so-called winset, which is the set of its realistically taken alternatives. The success of any policy, whether in favour of the status quo, or of its winset, stems from the number and strength of veto players, who support it. Veto players are "individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo". The current status quo rests on the unanimity core, or the set of actions that meet common agreement of all the veto players. As they all agree about the policies contained in the unanimity core, non of them supports any change to it. The more veto players are there in the political system, the larger is the unanimity core, and the least is the likelihood of policy change.
In other words, more veto players give more inertia to current policies. Veto players can emerge or disappear through a twofold mechanism of institutional change. Firstly, they can be institutional veto players, designated as such through the legal rules of the constitutional order. Secondly, they can emerge as partisan veto players, i.e. political forces that form within the space given to political rivalry by the given set of constitutional rules. Ideological distances between individual veto players are just as important for the formation of policies, as the constitutional division of powers. For example, the ideological distance between the president in office, and the majoritarian party in the parliament may influence the policy making just as strongly, as would do the constitutional partition of powers between the president, and the parliament. A substantial body of research claims that the partisan fragmentation within a given constitutional framework has significant impact upon public policies (Weingast et al. axes of discrimination seem to be internal diversity, and stability. The former refers to variously measured number of distinct veto players, both constitutional and partisan. As for structural stability, it is the opposite of democratic competition in the system. Constitutional orders change slowly, and not very frequently. On the other hand, the partisan structure of political systems may change much faster. An interesting question appears in that context, namely whether at all and to what extent can a change in the partisan structure within a given constitutional order impact the pattern of capital appropriation in public agents, and what overall changes in fiscal policy can such a change provoke. This is the predictive issue that the present paper attempts to explore. where T stands for revenues (which are usually and for the major part made of tax revenues), ∆D means current borrowing or the change in the overall gross public debt, E represents gross expenditures of the government, and ∆C is the change in capital held by the government.
Equation (1) The point of all that structural specification is to demonstrate that the broad category of fiscal flows that we use to call "public expenditures" (mostly for the sake of convenience) is actually a financial compound. It covers both the expenditures strictly spoken (i.e. current payments for goods and services), and capital outlays that accrue to many different pockets of capital appropriated by public agents in many different ways.
Capital accruals have different cycles, ranging from the ultra-short (days or weeks) cycle of consolidated accounting in budgetary units, passing through the mid-range cycle of appropriation in executive agencies and public-private partnerships, up to the frequently many-decade long cycle of capital appropriation in targeted public funds.
Each of those pockets of capital makes a unit of economic power, in the hands of some public agents. Each accrual to of from such a capital pocket means a shift up or down in the actual economic power of those agents. Equation (2) formalizes this step in theoretical development, with the acronyms BU, EA, TF, and PP standing, respectively for: budgetary units, executive agencies, targeted funds, and public-private partnerships.
Equation (3) goes further in this path and states that the total stream of financial inflows to public treasury, through current revenues and current borrowing, is congruent with the sum of the strictly spoken public expenditures, and capital accruals in the public sector.
Following the distinction marked in equations (2) and (3), two basic models of budgetary accounting are possible: the cash-based on the one hand, and the accrual based one on the other hand. The cash-based model largely prevails in the world, and allows public agents to record officially their fiscal flows only when, and just when cash is spent or received, respectively as for public expenditures and public revenues.
Conversely, the accrual-based model compels public agents to record fiscal flows when the corresponding economic events take place; in other words, it assumes that the emergence of liabilities or claims on the part of public agents is equivalent to actual cash flows. The cash-based system, still applied in the fiscal practice of most countries, allows public agents to keep some bills unpaid until the creditors become impatient in legal terms, thus to create and illusion of good fiscal performance in the meantime, and to pump up gross public indebtedness. Similarly, that system allows leaving some tax claims without actual enforcement, thus creating a discreetly governed system of unofficial tax crediting for the chosen ones. In terms of the theoretical model of the present research, the cash-based system is the very foundation of all the small, semihidden pockets of capital present in the public sector. It also encourages the phenomenon known as budgetary slack, which consists in deliberate, financial underperformance on the part of public agents, in order to obtain or to retain more capital than they actually need to carry out the mission assigned (see for example:
Jensen 2003 transfer from the public sector to the private one: when governments borrow, and spend the capital borrowed, they pays for goods and services supplied by the private sector, but keep on endorsing the liability resulting from borrowing. It is important to remember, among others, that a substantial part of public spending, namely the wages of public officers, are technically paid to private persons employed at the corresponding jobs. Thus, the payroll of the public sector is a cash transfer to the private sector, too.
Summing up, the theoretical model applied in the empirical research presented further, assumes that the fiscal stance of any government represents two different types of financial occurrences: current flows and capital accruals. They can be partly independent from each other, and studied separately.
Any veto player in the political system derives their actual political power from two factors, namely political legitimation, and actual economic power conveyed by the natural possession of capital. Veto players in the political system temporarily appropriate each capital accrual in the public sector. For the purposes of the present research, it is further assumed that said appropriation is significantly additive, i.e. the more veto players in the system, the more capital they need to support their political legitimation.
Quantitative empirical research
The basic idea behind quantitative empirical research introduced in this chapter was to verify the assumption that political systems differ with respect to liquid capital balances held by the public sector, and that changes in the partisan structure of the political 
Classification of political systems
The first, somehow preliminary step of empirical research was to establish a classification of political systems, according to the previously introduced, theoretical distinctions. The classification of political systems for the purposes of the present research starts with the constitutional approach, and follows into the partisan one. In order to represent the basic constitutional structure of political systems, two variables have been selected in the rich structure of the Database of Political Systems. The first is the type of political system according to the presence and powers of the president, 44 Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer The general assumption is that regimes with a strong component of electoral plurality favour "winner-takes-it-all" elections. This, in turn, promotes the interests of big, strong political parties, making them strong veto players, and reduces the veto playing positions of small parties. In other words, plural electoral regimes tend to reduce the overall number of partisan veto players, but they confer important impact to the players who manage to enter the scene. On the other hand, proportionality in elections allows a broader representation of small political parties and non-partisan representatives in the legislative body. That creates more veto players with more disparate political power.
As for the partisan structure of the political system, the most general variable in the DPI seems to be political polarization, more specifically: POLARIZ, and POLARIZ_STRICT.
They are compound variables, based partly competitiveness in the appointment of legislators and executives of the government (variables: LIEC and EIEC), and partly upon the maximum difference between the chief executive's party's value (EXECRLC) and the values of the three largest government parties and the largest opposition party. The latter valuation is made on the grounds of the basic distinction of economic programs into: conservative, Christian democratic, communist, socialist, social democratic, and centrist. We have POLARIZ = 0, when the democratic competitiveness is below a critical level, as well as when the ruling party does not focus on economic issues or when there is no clear information. Otherwise, and according to doctrinal differences, the variable can take the value of 1 or 2.
The detailed composition of the sample of observations studied is given in the Appendix (Table 2) That appears as a logical consequence of the "winner-takes-it-all" principle in plural elections, which favours big electoral funds and robust campaigns, and clearly discourages ideological discords. Those observable clusters are an indication for further quantitative analysis, to consider those three clusters as three dominant types of political systems.
Constitutional orders with assembly -elected presidents are very feebly represented in the sample: 57 observations across both electoral regimes and all the possible cases of partisan polarization. Hence, this category can be treated rather as an exception that an important case. Still, an interesting pattern emerges systems with assembly -elected presidents, namely the absence of moderately polarized partisan structures. This particular class of political systems displays either no polarization at all, or a very pronounced one. Thirdly, and this seems the most important for predictive purposes, countries studied tend to stay quite firmly within one pattern of constitutional order, over the period of observation, yet they frequently move between various cases of partisan polarization. Thus, it confirms one of the theoretical intuitions expressed in the introduction, namely that predicting the fiscal function of partisan political structures might have a greater practical value that the prediction of outcomes brought by constitutional changes.
Political systems and basic fiscal aggregates
The next step of empirical investigation was to follow the disparities of typical fiscal aggregates across political systems. Fiscal aggregates have been divided into two categories, namely current and capital, following the basic intuitions of the present research. The structural fiscal balance, gross public revenues, and gross public expenditures are classified as current aggregates, i.e. rather flows than balances.
Conversely, gross and net public debt is considered as capital measures (balances rather than flows). The differential between gross and net debt, namely the amount of financial assets held by the public sector, is included in this category too 47 .
As for gross public revenues, parliamentary systems are clearly tax-greedier than the presidential ones (Table 3 , Appendix). They also seem much more sensitive to political polarization: any increase in that respect is connected to significantly higher public revenues. Gross public expenditures follow a similar pattern, and yet, within each constitutional order, they seem much more sensitive than revenues to shifts in political polarization. The observation of structural fiscal balances seems to indicate that the shift from no observable polarization to moderate one has more impact than a further deepening of polarization from moderate to high.
Variables referring to capital accruals in the public sector display a significantly greater disparity across political systems than current flows do. In other words, the empirically observable differences between political systems as for their patterns of capital appropriation are noticeably more pronounced than differences referring to current fiscal management. It proves that the central assumption of the present paper is a material, real distinction worth further research (Table 4 , Appendix).
Following the observable clustering of political systems in the sample studies, three "big" types are defined for the purposes of further empirical investigation. They are: a) Cluster #1: Presidential systems with plural elections, and no observable political polarization: structural balance -2,651% of GDP, gross public indebtedness 55,186% of the GDP, financial assets held by the public sector 9,151% of the GDP 47 The author is aware of the conceptual risk connected to that variable. Those financial assets include, for a large part, those held by central banks as monetary reserves. Thus, this could be a monetary variable rather that a fiscal one. Yet, the amount of those financial assets in public hands is not exclusively monetary, in the first place, and, secondly, it impacts significantly the fiscal, borrowing capacity of the government. Hence, this is a variable at the fringe of fiscal policy, and the rest of the economy. observation is that cluster #1, which hosts the least veto players in the system, seems to be the most frugal in fiscal terms, both with respect to current fiscal management, and to capital appropriation. Any shift from this cluster, thus any addition of veto players, through constitutional rules or partisan polarization, is clearly associated to more profusion in fiscal stances. Considering constitutional and partisan distinctions as an overall indicator of the number of veto players in the system, we can roughly consider clusters #1, and #3 as the opposite poles of the scale, with cluster #2 found somewhere in the middle. Cluster #1 has probably the least veto players, cluster #3 has the most of them, and cluster #2 is a medium case. Following this intuition, the presence of more veto players in the political system is associated most of all to a much greater tendency of the public sector to accumulate liquid financial assets.
Socio-economic outcomes of fiscal policies
The next step in empirical research was to assess the impact of fiscal policies upon As the same regression is run in sub-samples defined according to the previously adopted classification of political systems, one central observation is to note: the strength of the econometric connection increases, both at the level of the overall R 2 accuracy, and as for the t Student significance in particular variables. The link between fiscal policies and the formation of private savings seem to be system-specific.
Interestingly, the overall explanatory power of fiscal variables grows as the cluster studied moves towards a greater number of veto players. A pattern emerges: the more veto players in the political system, the greater the impact of fiscal policy upon the formation of savings.
As the present research is very much oriented on capital appropriation in the public sector, gross public debt and financial assets held by the public sector deserve a closer look as explanatory factors. In the general sample, both have positive impact upon private savings. The influence of gross public debt seems relatively weak, while the accumulation of financial assets by public agents is a strongly positive and significant 49 Detailed results of regression tests are presented in tables 5 -8, in the Appendix.
factor. When split into the three clusters, the same regression shows really disparate results. In the clusters #1 and #2, gross public debt seems to be rather a disturbing factor regarding private savings, whilst in the cluster #3 it is strongly and positively correlated. The accumulation of financial assets in the public sector changes its impact upon private savings from cluster to cluster as well.
As we pass form the formation of private capital to its allocation in productive assets through investment, the first salient observation is the generally lower explanatory power of fiscal variables. Just as in the case of private savings, that explanatory power grows as we plunge into particular clusters of political systems. Once more, a systemspecific response to fiscal policy is to notice. In clusters #1 and #2, fiscal variables seem to be mostly a disturbing factor to private investment, whilst in the cluster #3 the relationship seems to be more stable. In other words, the more veto players in the political system, the more predictable the impact of fiscal policies upon private investment.
The primary completion rate is probably the most "social" and the least "economic" among the four outcome variables studied in this subchapter. It is also the least explained by fiscal variables in the general sample. With an R 2 equal to 0,041, there is hardly any connection. Still, when going into specific clusters, the correlation significantly gains in robustness, and each cluster displays a different pattern of correlation. Just as in the case of private savings, as we move from cluster #1 to #3, thus as we add veto players in the system, the explanatory power of fiscal factors grows.
The rate of vulnerable employment is astride the social and the purely economic outcomes of fiscal policies. In the general sample, the explanatory power of fiscal variables is pretty strong. Differently from the previous outcomes under scrutiny, transferring the analysis to specific clusters does not unequivocally increase that explanatory power. Only the cluster #3 displays stronger correlation that the general sample. Still, one can notice the same phenomenon of the explanatory power gaining in strength, as more veto players are present in the system.
Case studies
The empirical part of the present research covers a qualitative part too. It consists of case studies connected to the previously signalled identity of three big clusters of political systems. The goal of the present study is contributing to the prediction of changes in fiscal policies that can possibly come out of changes in the partisan structure of the political system. Cases under scrutiny are countries, which migrated to or from any of the three clusters, during the period of observation. The choice of cases was quite intuitive, and the general purpose was to go more in depth of the general patterns observed in quantitative research. The first interesting case is Bolivia (see table 9 , Appenix). According to the here-adopted classification of political systems, the country ended up in the cluster #1, yet it was its end of the road, so to say. The span of observation as for this particular country ranged from 2000 through 2012.
Constitutionally, Bolivia had been a presidential system with plural elections over the whole period studied. At the beginning of the observation span, the political system of with an important reform of land property, and land management, inclusive of a new policy as for hydrocarbons (Postero, 2010 55 The change in political polarization was of opposite direction in each case (Bolivia 2 to 0; the U.S. 0 to 2), still a change there was. As case studies allow heuristic inference, a heuristic hypothesis can be formulated, namely that any change in the structure of partisan veto players in the political system is connected to increased accumulation of capital in the public sector, whatever the vector of change.
Mexico (Table 11 , Appendix), geographically between Bolivia, and the United States, is an interesting case of oscillatory changes with respect to the variables investigated.
Within its interval of observation, namely from 1998 through 2012, Mexico started in the cluster #1, left it quite quickly to move towards higher political polarization, but the movement was a wave rather than a trend. Over the period 2001-2009, political polarization passed from non-existent (POLARIZ = 0), through moderate to high, just to return to moderate from 2010 on. That political oscillation was accompanied, roughly in step, by a wavy change in capital fiscal variables (gross debt, net debt, financial assets), as well as that of the structural balanced. An unequivocally growing share of current fiscal flows in the GDP was to observe, as well as worsening ratios of savings and investment. Interestingly, the social situation seems to have had improved, as seen through the double lens of primary completion rate, and the rate of vulnerable employment. In general, growing political polarization was accompanied by shrinking indebtedness, both in gross and net terms, and by a growing amount of financial assets held by the government. It looks as if growing political polarization in this case went together with the building -up of borrowing capacity from the part of the public sector.
As cases from the cluster #1 are studied, Poland (Table 12 , Appendix) is an interesting one: it is a case of truly high, structural instability of the political system with respect to the variables studied. Over its interval of observation, namely 1995 -2012, Poland jumped between the cluster #1 and other groups of political systems, inclusive of changes in the electoral regime, coming and going between plurality and proportionality. At the very beginning of the span of observation, in the late 1990s, Poland had virtually no net public debt, and an extremely inflated pool of financial assets held by the public sector, in the presence of substantial gross public indebtedness. Since then, gross public indebtedness had slightly grown, which took place against a quickly growing net indebtedness, and an overall decreasing trend in the amount if financial assets in the public sector. One can also observe steady decrease in the share of current fiscal flows in the GDP. The rate of private savings had, on the whole, decreased, whilst private investment climbed slightly. On the social side, we can observe a steady improvement both as for the primary completion rate, and the rate of vulnerable employment. Change in political polarization seem to have been the most reflected in the oscillation of gross public indebtedness, and the amount of financial assets held in the public sector: both tend to be lower in the times of lower polarization, and to increase with higher polarization. Poland is a case of the overall steady economic change, in the presence of slight oscillations of capital fiscal variables, seemingly connected to variations in political fragmentation. The steady, long-term change seems to be attached to an outflow of capital from the public sector. Characteristically, that outflow came along with visible social improvement.
With the case of New Zealand (Table 13 , Appendix), we pass to countries grouped in the 
Conclusion
The present paper was written with the intention to follow up onto the path indicated by the seminal paper by Roubini and Sachs (1989) , namely to explore the intuition that the political system in place is a strong determinant of fiscal policy. Quantitative research suggests strong, cross-sectional disparities between political systems as for their typical fiscal stance, and those disparities seem to refer mostly to the amount of capital held by the public sector, rather than to current fiscal flows. The number of veto The more veto players in the political system, the greater seems to be the impact of fiscal policy upon some socio-economic outcomes, such as the formation of private savings, private investment or primary completion rate. Clearly, what we use to designate as efficiency of fiscal policy is very specific regarding the political system in place. In a broader perspective, the present paper comes to a somewhat different conclusion than the seminal work by Roubini and Sachs (1989) . Whilst these authors claimed that fiscal discipline clearly varies across political systems, the present research seems to prove that fiscal discipline is pretty homogenous, whilst the ways that public agents adopt to govern capital in their possession, and the outcomes of that governance, are clearly system-specific.
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